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ABSTRACT MONTEREY, CA 93943-5101
In 1992, the U.S. Marine Corps instituted a Command Screening Program (CSP)
to annually select the most qualified Lieutenant Colonels (LtCols) to command. Prior to
the CSP, the selection of Commanding Officers (COs) was left to the decision of the
Commanding Generals. This thesis establishes the methodology, conducted with the
current data available, to determine if the CSP is a "better" CO selection process and if
there is an overall career advantage for LtCols who command. Fitness report information,
without performance markings, was obtained for 3,417 officers. Each officer was placed
into one of four mutually exclusive groups, first dependent on whether the officer was a
CO as a LtCol or not and second whether retired or promoted prior to June 1, 1993 (the
date the CSP took effect) or not. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) include the mean
duration of a command tour, the proportions promoted, passed over, and voluntarily
retired, and the proportion promoted "early, on time, or late." Hypothesis tests are
conducted on the pairwise comparison of group proportions for each MOE. The results,
based on the MOEs, are somewhat mixed but generally indicate that the CSP is selecting
more effective COs. and that there is a career advantage for LtCols who command . The
results will be more convincing as the CO group that began command after June 1, 1993
gains more time in service and more time in rank. Currently only 8.9% of this group has
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The purpose of the Command Screening Program is to ensure that Marines receive
the best possible leadership and that every officer receives fair and equitable consideration
for the opportunity to command. All Lieutenant Colonels who have served in
Commanding Officer billets since June 1, 1993 have been selected for that position by an
annual selection board of senior level officers. Prior to 1992, the selection of commanders
was left to the decision of the division or wing level Commanding General in that unit's
chain of command.
This analysis determines whether the Command Screening Program is a
"better" system of selecting battalion and squadron Commanding Officers than the
method previously used for selection. A large population of officers (3417) was divided
into four mutually exclusive groups. The groups reflect whether or not an officer was
affected by the Command Screening Board and whether or not he was a Commanding
Officer at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used in
this analysis include the mean duration of a command tour, the proportions of officers
voluntarily retiring, promoted and passed over for the rank of Colonel, the proportion
promoted prior, within, or after their year group reached the primary zone for Colonel,
and the proportion of officers who eventually hold a command billet at the rank of
Colonel.
The conduct of the Command Screening Board is similar to that of a promotion
board. Each eligible Lieutenant Colonel's career summary is briefed to the 14 members of
the board, immediately followed by a vote as to whether the officer should be a
Commanding Officer or not. The product of the board is a list of all officers who
successfully "screened" for command, approximately 200% more than the anticipated
requirement (in case officers initially offered commands decide to decline). The remainder
of the eligible Lieutenant Colonels are considered "not screened." The assignment officers
(monitors) then match an officer to a specific commanding officer billet. If an officer
receives a Commanding Officer billet, then he is classified as "screened and slated," as
opposed to the other "screened" officers who now become "screened, not slated." For
this analysis, the officers are in either the "screened and slated" group (CO) or in the
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combined group consisting of the "screened, not slated" and "not screened" officers {Not
CO). Furthermore the officers are either not affected by the Command Screening Board
(Pre-CSB) or they are affected by it (Post-CSB) depending when they assumed command,
retired, or were promoted to Colonel.
B. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Zip Master Brief sheets, with all performance evaluations (fitness reports) for an
officer's career, without the actual performance markings, were the sources for acquiring
the pertinent information required to measure the MOEs on each of the 3417 officers. No
other data source, in digital format, is as definitive in determining whether an officer
actually possessed a true Commanding Officer fitness report or not.
The data was extracted from the data base of Headquarters Marine Corps,
Performance Evaluation Branch, in December 1996. Each officer's record is current as of
the last fitness report written, submitted, and entered into the data base prior to this date.
Common statistical tests, to include nonparametric methods, were used to analyze
the MOEs.
C. RESULTS
The Command Screening Process is more effective than the prior method of
selection in the following MOEs. If the results indicated enough difference to be
statistically significant, it is denoted by an asterisk (*).
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has been passed over for the rank of
Colonel. *
•A higher proportion ofCommanding Officers has been promoted early and on time
to Colonel.
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has been promoted late to Colonel.
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has retired immediately at the end of
their Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer billet. *
xn
The Command Screening Program possesses attributes that are supportive of the
process other than those that were analyzed by the MOEs. For instance, all Lieutenant
Colonels in the Marine Corps are considered for Commanding Officer billets under the
new method of selection, whereas under the prior method a Commanding General had to
choose from officers assigned to his command. Also, command assignments are managed
by the monitors, hence an officer's career is managed to ensure he gets the best mix of
staff and operational assignments required for positions of more responsibility.
There are also some drawbacks to the Command Screening Program when it is
compared to the prior method of selecting Commanding Officers, with the MOEs selected
for this analysis. Most notably, a lower proportion of officers have been promoted to
Colonel. Instead a higher proportion has voluntarily retired (*). Furthermore a lower
proportion has gone on to be Colonel Commanding Officers (*).
D. CONCLUSION
The Command Screening Process is achieving its stated objectives, as judged by
most MOEs utilized in this analysis. More career highlights of the majority of officers
affected by the Command Screening Process must come to pass before any statistically
definitive decisions on the value of the process can be reached, however the trends of the
proportions are generally favorable to the process. Having a Command Screening
Program does make the selection of Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officers a fair,
formal process, and actually that alone makes it worth keeping.
An analysis, using the same methodology, needs to be conducted every two years,
or so, to analyze the trends as the populations gain more time in service and more time in
rank. The lack of follow-on career data of officers affected by the Command Screening
Process decreased the amount of data available for analysis. For example, only 8.9% of
the Commanding Officer population affected by the Command Screening Process have





In 1992, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that a centralized process
by which Lieutenant Colonels are evaluated and screened for battalion and squadron level
commands be instituted. The Commandant wanted to ensure that the Marines of these
units received the best possible leadership and that every officer received fair and equitable
consideration for the opportunity to command. The Command Screening Program was
the answer to this directive and remains in effect today. All Lieutenant Colonels who have
served in Commanding Officer billets since June 1, 1993 have been selected for that
position by the Command Screening Process. The board convenes annually, is comprised
of senior level Marine Corps officers, and conducts their selection process similar to the
method used by a promotion board. Prior to the institution of the Command Screening
Program, the selection of commanders was left to the decision of the division or wing level
Commanding General in that unit's chain of command.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the Command Screening
Program is a "better" system of selecting battalion and squadron Commanding Officers
than the prior method. This evaluation required categorizing a large population of officers
into four mutually exclusive groups. The groups reflect whether or not an officer was
affected by the Command Screening process and whether or not he was a Commanding
Officer at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used in
this analysis required certain specific information on each individual officer. The MOEs
include the mean duration of command tours, the proportion of officers promoted to the
rank of Colonel, the proportion of officers retiring, and the proportion of officers who
eventually hold a command billet as a Colonel. The statistical analysis includes hypothesis
tests for comparison ofthe groups, using the MOEs.
A. BACKGROUND
The focus of the Command Screening Program is to ensure that the Marine Corps
most precious asset, the Marines, are provided with the best possible leadership [Ref. 1].
There are four basic tenets within this focus upon which the program stands. The first of
the tenets is to ensure Marines are led by the most qualified Lieutenant Colonels in the
Marine Corps. The second tenet is to ensure that all Lieutenant Colonels are afforded an
equal opportunity to compete for command. At Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
level, the records of all eligible Lieutenant Colonels are reviewed for possible selection as
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a Commanding Officer, as opposed to the old system where a Commanding General had
only those officers in his command from which to choose.
The third tenet is to formalize command assignments. This helps HQMC manage
an officer's career, ensuring the officer gets the best mix of staff and operational
assignments required for positions of more responsibility. The fourth and final tenet is to
eliminate sponsorship and cronyism. Under the prior selection system, there was a
possibility that an outstanding Lieutenant Colonel would not be selected for a
Commanding Officer billet for the mere reason that a Commanding General did not know
him. [Ref. 2]
B. COMMAND SCREENING PROCEDURES
An annual Command Screening Board meets during July to select the Lieutenant
Colonels who will occupy the Commanding Officer billets being vacated 12 to 24 months
after the board convenes (slate year). The board consists of three General officers and
eleven Colonels with diverse military occupational specialties and each with a broad
breadth of experience. The precept ofthe board, given to them by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, is to select the best and most qualified officers to command Marine Corps
battalions and squadrons.
Prior to this board, an annual billet validation has been completed. The billet
validation determines which Commanding Officer billets will be vacated during the
following slate year. There are 279 Commanding Officer billets in the entire Marine Corps
for Lieutenant Colonels. The billets are divided into two categories, Operating Forces
Commands (220 billets) and Supporting Establishments Commands (59 billets). The
Operating Forces commands are with the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units whereas the
Supporting Establishments are all other commands. Examples of Supporting
Establishments include Marine Security Guard Companies and Recruit Training
Battalions. [Ref. 3]
The board is provided with the master personnel files of all officers eligible for
selection. A Lieutenant Colonel is eligible if he has at least two years at his current
assignment (or can be assigned a command at his current duty station), has not served in a
command tour previously as a Lieutenant Colonel, has not requested in writing that he not
be considered, and does not possess a voluntary or mandatory retirement date. The
number of officers eligible for the board has decreased since the first board in Fiscal Year
(FY) 93 (see Figure 1), thus decreasing the population of Lieutenant Colonels considered
for command. [Ref. 1]
Figure 1. Number of Eligible Officers for the
Command Screening Board, by Fiscal Year.
The master personnel files are a microfilm record of the performance evaluations
(fitness reports), commendatory material, and derogatory material in the official record of
each officer. Inherent to each fitness report is an evaluation of the officer's performance
for a reporting period of three to twelve months. An officer's entire fitness report history
is summarized on a Master Brief Sheet. A member of the board will brief an individual
officer's career to the remainder of the board. All of the board members then vote as to
whether the officer should be selected to be a Commanding Officer or not. There is no
absolute standard that officers are measured against to determine success or failure of
selection by this board. Performance relative to the other officers being considered is the
primary discriminator. [Ref. 2]
Lieutenant Colonels' command tour lengths are generally prescribed as 18-24
months in duration. However, Commanding Generals are free to make the final
determination ofhow long an officer remains in the Commanding Officer billet. Emphasis
is slanted toward longer (24 month) tours to enhance personnel stability and cohesion.
Therefore, approximately 130 to 190 of the 279 Commanding Officer billets in the Marine
Corps are vacated each year. In order to ensure the availability of enough officers for
assignment, the Command Screening Board selects 200% of the number of officers
required to fill the anticipated vacancies. [Ref. 1]
The board selects 200% of the required number because some of the officers
selected may currently be filling a critical joint billet, acquisition billet, or some other billet
with unanticipated restrictions. The selection of200% also provides alternates for officers
who are initially offered command, but do not accept it. [Ref. 4]
Lieutenant Colonels selected by the board to command are considered "screened"
(for command) and officers who are not selected to command by the board are considered
"not screened" (for command). All of the Lieutenant Colonels that were eligible for the
board are now considered in either the "screened" or "not screened" group.
In addition, the Command Screening Board produces two other reports. The first
report is a listing of whether an officer is selected for an Operating Forces Command or a
Supporting Establishments Command. A "screened" officer is notified by telephone, and
by mail, of his status on this first report. The second report is a "ranking" of officers
successfully "screened." This is a private report in which all of the "screened" officers are
ranked as to whether their performance puts them into the top third, middle third, or
bottom third of their peers on the "screened" list. Within each of the three groups, there is
no determination of rank order. This report is not published to the Marine Corps, or even
reported to those officers "screened. " This private report is for the use of the officer
assignment officers (monitors) who ensure that vacancies in all Commanding Officer
billets are filled without a time gap between commanders. The monitors are responsible
for assigning an officer to a specific billet at the appropriate date. [Ref. 4]
In the next step of the Command Screening Process, the monitors notify and
congratulate all of the "screened" officers on the list from the board. At this time, they
solicit the "screened" officers' desires as to duty station preferences and specific battalion,
squadron, or supporting establishment preferences, as appropriate. Once this input is
received for the entire "screened" list, the monitor will examine the Commanding Officer
billets being vacated and match them up, as much as possible, with the "screened" officers'
preferences. All of the officers in the top third, and about half of the officers in the second
third, will be assigned to specific command billets, even if their specific duty station
location and specific command preference can not be met. The officers in the top third of
the private list are more likely to get their preferences than the middle third. This
procedure is referred to as the slating process. Once this matching exercise is completed
and approved at the HQMC level, an "initial slate" is published to inform the entire Marine
Corps. [Ref. 4]
At this point, all of the Lieutenant Colonels that were eligible for the Command
Screening Board can be placed into one of three groups. Recall that prior to the slating
process all eligible officers belong to either the "screened" or "not screened" category.
Now the "screened" group is further broken down into the "screen, not slated" and the
"screened and slated" (or just "slated," the "screened" status is implied) category.
All of the Lieutenant Colonels in the Marine Corps can now be categorized into
one of the three above groups, or the "not eligible" group because of the Command
Screening Process. Figure 2 illustrates the progression of the process. The bold print
shows the path that must be traversed by a Lieutenant Colonel to become a Commanding
Officer.
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"Slated" "Not Slated"
Figure 2. Categorization of Lieutenant Colonels as a Result of the Command Screening Process.
All "slated" officers must respond to the monitor, in writing, as to whether they
accept or decline their command assignment [Ref. 4]. Some successfully "slated" officers
decline the command and may even decide to retire instead of accepting the command at
this point in the process. One reason an officer may decline is that he strongly desired an
operational command, but he was offered a supporting command. Rather than settle for
the supporting command, he requests retirement.
When all of the responses are back to the monitor, the slating process is conducted
once again [Ref. 4]. At this time, it is feasible that even some of the officers in the bottom
third of the private list may be offered commands. Keep in mind that although they are in
the bottom third of the "screened" group, they are still a part of the best and most
qualified of eligible Lieutenant Colonels. Through sufficient contact with the officers
being offered command, the monitors know who will and who will not accept orders to
command. At this time, the "modified slate" is published and considered a final document.
Also, this is the final determination of whether an officer is "screened, not slated" or
"slated." An officer could be switched among the two groups in the time between the
initial slate and the revised slate. The number of officers within each of the three groups is







B Screened, Not Slated
Screened and Slated
Figure 3. Results of Command Screening Program Slating Process, by Fiscal
Year.
There is another way to look at the results of the Command Screening Board and
the subsequent slating process. Lieutenant Colonels who are "slated" get Commanding
Officer billets, and officers that are in the "not screened" and "screened, not slated"
groups do not get Commanding Officer billets . When the results of the Command
Screening Process are viewed in this fashion, as shown in Table 1, one can see the
relatively small percentage of eligible officers who actually receive command.
Year Not Command Command % that Command
FY93 816 184 18.40
FY94 669 135 16.79
FY95 500 161 24.36
FY96 550 131 19.24
Table 1. Percentage of Eligible officers that Command.
It is important to note that the Command Screening Program is still in its early
stage and suggestions for improvement are continuously being developed. For example,
during the annual General Officer Symposium held in 1995, the Generals suggested to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps that the results of the board, listing the "screened"
officers ofthose who were eligible for the board, not be released in a message to the entire
Marine Corps [Ref 5]. The perception was that a Lieutenant Colonel was labeled as one
with a successful future if his name was on the "screened" list, as opposed to one whose
name was not on the list (one who was a "not screened" officer) [Ref 6]. If both officers
worked for the same Colonel or General at the time the list was published, the impression
was that the "screened" officer received preferential treatment in regard to duties,
responsibilities, and ranking in fitness reports. This seemed justifiable because HQMC had
already stated, by publication of the list, that the "screened" officer was more qualified for
command than was the "not screened" officer. [Ref. 7]
The list was not published for the FY97 results. The officers eligible for the board
were personally notified of their status through other means. However, what the Marine
Corps discovered was that the word ofwho was "screened" and who was "not screened"
became common knowledge via word of mouth anyway. Therefore, it was decided that
the selection board list will once again be published for the FY98 results. [Ref. 8]
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
As previously stated, the purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the
Command Screening Program is a "better" system of selecting battalion and squadron
commanders than the previous method of letting the commanding generals choose their
Commanding Officers from the officers assigned to their commands.
The officers in the data set were partitioned into four populations (or groups),
based on their characterization at the rank ofLieutenant Colonel.
•Pre-CSB CO (Pre-Command Screening Board, Commanding Officer): This group
consists of officers who held Commanding Officer billets under the prior method
of selection. The Command Screening Process did not affect their careers.
•Pre-CSB Not CO (Pre-Command Screening Board, Not a Commanding Officer):
This group never held the billet of Commanding Officer . The Command Screening
Process did not affect their careers.
•Post-CSB CO (Post-Command Screening Board, Commanding Officer): This
group was placed in the billet of Commanding Officer by the selection of the
Command Screening Process.
•Post-CSB Not CO (Post-Command Screening Board, Not a Commanding
Officer): This group has not held the billet of Commanding Officer, although
affected by the Command Screening Process.
To analyze the effects of the Command Screening Board from a statistical
standpoint, MOEs must be selected and computed for each of the four groups. The
selection of the MOEs must be based on information (data) available for the analysis.
There are numerous opinions about the Command Screening Process throughout the
senior officer ranks, generally in favor of the process. However, these opinions can not
easily be measured and structured for a statistical analysis.
The first MOE analyzed was related to the duration of time served in each
Commanding Officer billet as a Lieutenant Colonel, namely the mean duration of a
command tour. Approximately six percent of the Pre-CSB CO group had two or more
Commanding Officer tours and consequently a longer command duration per officer on
average than the Post-CSB CO group. When the data is partitioned into the length of each
tour, it can be determined if a unit is receiving consistency of command. Therefore, the
mean duration of a command tour is of interest to the Marine Corps. This analysis will
determine if the mean tour duration of a Commanding Officer has increased, decreased, or
remained the same since the introduction of the Command Screening Board.
The second MOE determines if there had been more or fewer officers "relieved
from command" since the Command Screening Board went into effect. A Commanding
Officer who has been relieved from command has failed to complete his assigned tour
length of 18 to 24 months, usually for some negative reason about his performance.
Because there is no actual record kept on the number of relieved Commanding Officers
[Ref. 9], an assumption was made that if an officer had less than some "x" number of
months as a Commanding Officer then he must have been relieved for cause. Although
the data used for this analysis was not totally reliable in determining this categorization,
the results do include some answers (with cautious reservation) on this facet.
The third MOE used to analyze the populations was the proportion of officers
from the group who were promoted to the rank of Colonel. Furthermore, within each
group, a comparison was conducted on the proportions of officers promoted below,
within, or above the primary promotion zone for that officer's year group, given that they
were promoted to Colonel.
The fourth MOE measured the groups' proportion of officers retiring prior to
entering the primary zone for consideration to the rank of Colonel. In some cases, this
MOE provided some interesting results when analyzed together with the fifth MOE. The
fifth MOE measures the proportion of the group that retired (as Lieutenant Colonels) after
they had been in the primary zone for consideration to the rank of Colonel. An
assumption is made that the officers included in the data for the fourth MOE retired due to
impending or actual "time in service" limitations. When these two MOEs are viewed
together, for the same population, one can observe the propensity of the group to retire
voluntarily vice waiting (often in vain) to be selected for Colonel by the selection board.
A sixth MOE measures the proportion of Commanding Officers retiring
immediately at the end of their Commanding Officer tour.
The seventh MOE measures the proportion of officers who held Commanding
Officer billets at the rank of Colonel, given that they were selected to the rank of Colonel.
D. POPULATIONS FOR ANALYSIS
Data was obtained on all officers who were Lieutenant Colonels in the Marine
Corps as of September 1, 1988 through September 1, 1992 and all officers who were
eligible (as explained in Section B) for one or more of the Lieutenant Colonel Command
Screening Boards from FY93 through FY96. The career data on the officers included all
that was available as ofDecember 1996. The Pre-CSB CO group consists of Lieutenant
Colonels who began their tours in Commanding Officer billets prior to June 1, 1993. The
Post-CSB CO group are commanders who began their tours after (and including) this
date. If an officer, who had never held a Commanding Officer billet, retired or was
promoted to Colonel prior to June 1, 1993 then he was placed in the Pre-CSB Not CO
group.
The composition of the Post-CSB Not CO group is perhaps the hardest to
understand. Over 71 percent of the officers in this category were "eligible" for at least
one of the Command Screening Boards held from FY93 to FY96 (so their status was
either "not screened," or "screened, not slated"). It is reasonable to suspect that a large
portion of the remainder of the officers were eligible for the FY97 board, but it is not
possible to verify this suspicion because the FY97 Command Screening Board results
were not published. A very small portion of the officers in this group were ineligible for
any of the Command Screening Boards, due to being in one of the ineligible categories
mentioned in Section B. Officers in this small group were either promoted or retired prior
to becoming eligible for a Command Screening Board. The number of officers in each of




The data base consists of a portion of the official military records on all of the
officers selected for the analysis as presented in Chapter I, Section D. Duplicated data
was eliminated so that the information for each officer was in the data base only once.
This resulted in the possession of 3417 officer's records.
The primary source of data was the Zip Master Brief Sheet for each of the above
selected officers. These were obtained from Performance Evaluation Branch, HQMC.
The Zip Master Brief Sheets are similar to the document used by the members of the
board for the Command Screening Process. The only difference is that the Zip Master
Brief Sheets do not include any performance markings. Recall that Master Brief Sheets
contain a listing of an officer's entire fitness report history.
The Zip Master Brief Sheets were extracted from the data base in December 1996.
Therefore, the information on a given officer is current as of his most recent fitness report
that was submitted and entered into the data base prior to this date. The fitness report
information was vital to the analysis in that it provided dates of career highlights that were
necessary to determine the data for the MOEs used in the analysis.
There are several important fields within the fitness reports that were used for
career analysis. The fields are defined in the Marine Corps Order concerning the
Performance Evaluation System [Ref 10]. Each definition is followed by an example of
the field.
•Monitored Command: The descriptive title and location of the unit to which the
officer was assigned (for example, "5th Battalion, 1 1th Marines").
•Organization: The organization, within the Monitored Command above, to
which the officer was assigned (for example, "Headquarters Battery, Artillery
Battalion").
•Duty Assignment: The billet to which the officer was assigned for the reporting
period (for example, "Battalion Commander").
•Grade: The rank of the officer during the reporting period (for example,
Lieutenant Colonel denoted by "LTCOL").
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•Begin date and End date: The dates the reported performance occurred, given
in year, month, and day format (for example, "930529 to 940421" indicates the
period from May 29, 1993 to April 21, 1994).
•Months: The number of months included from the "begin date" to the "end date,"
rounded to the nearest month (for example, "11" for the above example "begin
date" and "end date").
•Occasion: A code indicating the reason the report was submitted (for example,
"AN" indicates the fitness report was an annually required report).
The example in the definitions depicts a member of the Pre-CSB CO category. The
example officer held a legitimate Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer billet as an
Artillery Battalion Commander. He was serving in his command billet prior to June 1,
1993 so he was not selected for the Commanding Officer billet by the Command
Screening Process.
The "begin date" of an officer's first fitness report, along with his "grade" (rank) at
that time, was used as an initialization point for computing the officer's time in service and
to determine if the officer entered the Marine Corps as a Second Lieutenant. This was
used for analysis requiring retirement information. The "begin date" of his first report as
Lieutenant Colonel was also important. This date determined when he was in the primary
promotion zone for promotion to Colonel. The "end date" of his final report, perhaps
noting his retirement, was also an important field for this analysis. In the method used to
extract pertinent data from the data base, each Lieutenant Colonel's total time spent in a
Commanding Officer billet was determined by addition of the number of months found in
each of the "months" fields on fitness reports that were noted as being a legitimate
Commanding Officer billet. This portion of the data was partitioned into the duration of
each command tour, when that specific MOE was being analyzed.
Three of the most important fields of the fitness report are the "duty assignment,"
"monitored command," and "organization." These fields were the basis for determination
if an officer was in a true Commanding Officer billet during that particular reporting
period. There are numerous entries within the duty assignment field that can depict a
Commanding Officer tour. An inspection of the "monitored command" and
"organization" to which he belonged, helped clarify if the report should be flagged as an
actual Commanding Officer tour or not. Also some billet descriptions indicate
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"Commanding Officer," when a closer look at the "monitored command" and
"organization" fields show that the officer was actually only a detachment commander. A
detachment commander, not possessing the promotion, retention, and disciplinary
authority of a Commanding Officer, was not counted as a Commanding Officer for the
purpose of this analysis.
The "occasion" of the report was an important field, because an "EN7 ' code in the
"occasion" field of a fitness report denotes an "end of active service" fitness report. This
is an officer's final report as a Marine and therefore provided the flag for an officer's
retirement. Numerous officers did not possess this code in the "occasion" block, but they
also did not have a fitness report on record for the previous 18 months (or longer). An
annual (code "AN") fitness report is due every twelve months on all Marine Corps
officers, which means that at a minimum every officer should have at least one fitness
report on record for the previous twelve month period. There are usually reports more
frequently than twelve months due to the numerous "occasions" that require a report be
submitted. Therefore, an assumption was made that if an officer did not have a fitness
report on record since 1994, a liberal 23 months to provide a grace period for possible
administrative oversight, then he was considered to be retired. If the last fitness report on
the officer's Zip Master Brief Sheet was not already an "EN" report, then a manual change
was made to the data base used for this analysis, to consider it as an "EN" report, thus
signaling a retired officer.
B. VALIDITY OF THE DATABASE
The Zip Master Brief Sheets provide the best source of data for an analysis of this
type. There are no other data bases, maintained in digital format, that offer such
clarification on Commanding Officer billet assignments. The only way to unravel the true
Commanding Officer population is to tediously inspect each fitness report's "duty
assignment," "monitored command," and "organization" fields.
Unfortunately the Zip Master Brief Sheet entries are only as accurate as the fitness
reports that are written on the officer. This has opened an opportunity for administrative
errors that hinder an analysis of this type. For example, a Commanding Officer report
stating that it covers a 99 month reporting period, when it actually covers only nine
months, would skew the MOE of "command tour duration." As noted in the preceding
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section, another common administrative mistake occurred in the "occasion" field of the
officer's final fitness report. It was often not marked as an "EN," end of active service,
report.
The actual Commanding Officer billets were relatively easy to determine for dates
after the Command Screening Board was instituted, because the billets are outlined in a
Marine Corps Order [Ref. 3]. For the questionable Commanding Officer tours before the
Command Screening Board, a determination was made on their legitimacy based on the
same Marine Corps Order. The order provided a good basis for a judgment call, if not an
obvious decision, even though the order was not in effect at the time. A flag character
was inserted into the data base to facilitate later extraction, by computer routines, of
pertinent data. The final flagging determination of Commanding Officer billets was not
taken lightly. The determination was conducted repeatedly, when organizing the data for
analysis, checking and double checking for correctness at any sign of question.
Furthermore, the fitness report history lacks complete official information. For
example, in this analysis an officer was considered to have been promoted to the rank of
Colonel on the beginning date of his first Colonel fitness report. Perhaps this officer was
"frocked," which means that he was allowed to wear the rank insignia of the next higher
rank prior to his official promotion date. This sometimes occurs because the officer was
filling a Colonel billet while he was still at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Ifhe was given
a fitness report at the time of frocking, then he is considered to have been promoted to
Colonel prior to his year group being in the primary zone for consideration, for the




The discussion so far has already presented some of the assumptions necessary to
properly conduct this analysis. Other assumptions, as well as those previously mentioned,
are presented here for consolidation.
Manual corrections were made to the data base when administrative errors were
found on fitness reports. Potential discrepancy reports were generated in the computer
programs that processed the data. Suspect entries were researched thoroughly, and
corrective action was taken when necessary. It is assumed that if there are any errors that
effect the fields used to determine MOEs, they are consistent errors throughout all four
populations and insignificant.
If an officer had not received a fitness report since 1994, he was considered to be
retired. The data base was recovered from the Performance Evaluation Branch, HQMC
files in December 1996. All fitness reports received and entered into the data base by that
time are included in this analysis. If the last fitness report on record for an officer was in
1994 or prior, it was assumed that the officer was retired. The last fitness report
"occasion" field was manually changed to an "end of active service" (code "EN") report, if
it was not already coded as such, which flagged the retirement of the officer.
On occasion, there was a challenge in determining if a fitness report with a "begin
date" prior to June 1, 1993 (Pre-CSB) qualified to be considered as a legitimate
Commanding Officer fitness report. An inspection of the "duty assignment," "monitored
command," and "organization" was usually enough to clarify the report and make a
determination if the report should be credited as being a Commanding Officer report. In
cases that were still questionable, it was assumed that the current Marine Corps Order
addressing the Commanding Officer billets that the Command Screening Process uses for
billet validation [Ref. 3] was a reliable document to verify if that billet was a Commanding
Officer billet, even during the period prior to the existence of the Command Screening
Process.
Within the Post-CSB Not CO group, there may have been a few officers who were
ineligible for any of the Command Screening Boards because of one of the reasons
previously mentioned in Chapter I. It is highly suspected, though, that the majority of
"unaccounted for Lieutenant Colonels" were considered for selection by the unpublished
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FY97 board. Even if there were officers who were never eligible, they are still part of the
group that was previously defined as one that was affected by the Command Screening
Process. An assumption is made that since the board was in effect at the time of their
retirement or promotion, the fact that there was now a Command Screening Process did
influence their decision to retire or, in some cases, to wait for the opportunity to be
promoted to Colonel.
The first Command Screening Board was held in FY93 for selection of Lieutenant
Colonels to be slated for Commanding Officer billets being vacated after June 1, 1993.
There was a nine month period where an officer, and the rest of the Marine Corps, had
knowledge of the FY93 board results. Some of the "not screened" officers may have been
given a chance at command, based on the judgment of their Regimental Commander or
Commanding General. These officers were placed in the Pre-CSB CO group since their
command assignment began prior to June 1, 1993. The assumption is made that there
were no "change of plans" in regard to who was placed in Commanding Officer billets
during this transition period.
If an officer was in a Commanding Officer billet, but failed to command more than
seven months, he was considered to be "relieved from command" for the purposes of this
analysis. Caution was taken to ensure that this small number of officers were serving in
billets with all of the promotion, retention, and disciplinary authority of true Commanding
Officers. Close inspection of the data showed that all of these officers were placed in
duty assignments of relatively little significance for the remainder of their careers, after
their short Commanding Officer tour, and then retired when they were eligible (20 years).
This category was approached with reservation, because the determination of a "relatively
insignificant duty assignment" is based on the judgment of the author. There were other
officers who completed longer and regular duration tours (8-24 months) who also went on
to relatively insignificant duty assignments. Some of them may have been relieved from
command also, but they were not considered as such for this analysis.
The "eligible" list for Colonel promotion boards was not available, therefore the
"begin date" of an officer's first Lieutenant Colonel report determined the year for which
he was in the primary zone for consideration of promotion to the rank of Colonel. The
"fitness report determined eligible date," and the date that each year's Colonel Promotion
List started promoting and finished promoting (cleared), was compared to an officer's first
Colonel fitness report "begin date." The Colonel's Promotion Lists information, for each
year, was obtained from HQMC, Officer Promotion Branch (Code MMPR1). A
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comparison of the dates was made to determine whether an officer was promoted early,
on time, or late.
If an officer was promoted before the primary zone for his year group he was
considered an early (prior to his peers) promotion. It is assumed that he was selected in
the previous year when he was below the primary zone for consideration, but he may have
also been frocked as defined in Section B of Chapter II. There is no reason to believe that
frocking took place in any one of the four groups used for comparison more than in the
other three groups, so the frocking assumption will not skew the data. If an officer was
promoted at the same time as the officers in the primary zone for his year group, then he is
considered an on time (with his peers) promotion. If an officer was promoted one year or
more after the officers in the primary zone for his year group had all been promoted, he is
considered a late (after his peers) promotion. If an officer was in the Marine Corps long
enough to be considered for promotion to the rank of Colonel, but did not get promoted,
then an assumption was made that he had been "passed over" for promotion and given a
mandatory retirement date due to time in service limitations.
The only variable analyzed in this thesis is the institution of the Command
Screening Process. Ifthere were confounding variables that have affected the proportions
for the MOEs, they affected them consistently throughout the analysis. An example of a
confounding variable would be if the promotion opportunity to the rank of Colonel had
been increased from 50% to 60% after June 1, 1993 as a matter of policy. This would
allow a greater proportion of the Post-CSB groups to be promoted and hence would
increase the probability of the Post-CSB group's proportions being greater than the Pre-
CSB group's proportions in the promotion MOE.
B. STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
A "P value" will be given for the results of all statistical tests, instead of choosing
any level of significance. The "P value" is the smallest level of significance for which the
null hypothesis could be rejected. If the "P value" is small (close to zero, less than the
desired level of significance for the reader) then the null hypothesis is most likely not true,
so "rejecting" the null hypothesis is valid. The larger the "P value," the more sure one can
be that the null hypothesis is true, so "not rejecting" the null hypothesis is valid. For the
reader not comfortable with "P values," a level of significance of 0.01 is not unreasonable
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due to the high number of tests conducted on the data. This would mean that 1 time out
of 100, one would incorrectly reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true.
[Ref. 11]
In general, four types of comparisons (of two groups each) are made on the
applicable MOEs. Other permutations of the groups would not provide results of any
interest or analysis value. The four main comparisons are noted below.
•Pre-CSB CO and Pre-CSB Not CO
•Post-CSB CO and Post-CSB Not CO
•Pre-CSB CO and Post-CSB CO
•Pre-CSB Not CO and Post-CSB Not CO
The first two comparisons will show if there is an advantage for officers who have
commanded over officers who have not, and if that advantage has changed since the
institution of the Command Screening Board. The last two comparisons will show if there
have been any trends established, that differentiate the "Pre" and "Post* Command
Screening Board era.
When conducting this type of analysis, it is useful to postulate, prior to knowing
the results, what the results should show if the Command Screening Process is in fact
more effective than the prior method of selecting Lieutenant Colonel Commanding
Officers. These postulations are presented in the subsections below.
1. Duration of Commanding Officer Tours
This section looks at the mean length of time that a Lieutenant Colonel spends in
each Commanding Officer billet, also referred to as command tour duration. A computer
program extracted the duration of command time for each of the officers in the Pre-CSB
CO and Post-CSB CO groups from the data base to use for comparison.
This portion of the analysis will not determine if the Command Screening Process
is more effective, it is only a check to see if the Marines are getting better or worse
turnover of Commanding Officers in their units. If the mean command tour duration is the
same, then the same consistency of command has been maintained. If the mean command
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tour duration has increased (decreased), then the Command Screening Process has
improved (hindered) the consistency of command.
The Command Screening Process insures that Lieutenant Colonels receive only
one Commanding Officer tour. An officer is ineligible for future boards once he is slated,
therefore as many officers as possible receive an opportunity to command. This is one of
the basic tenets ofthe Command Screening Program.
Under the previous method of selection an officer could serve in multiple
Commanding Officer billets, as the Commanding General made the decision. The data
reveals that approximately six percent of the Pre-CSB CO group commanded in two, or
more, different commands. The length (duration in months) of each individual command
tour was extracted from the data base for officers with multiple commands.
The Marine Corps order on the Command Screening Program states that
"Continuity and consistency of command are paramount for stability in our units" [Ref 1].
This seems to contradict the desire to give more Lieutenant Colonels a chance to
command. A balance between the two desires is reached in directing that tour lengths will
generally be 18-24 months in duration for Commanding Officers selected by the Command
Screening Process.
Only command durations of Commanding Officers who completed their command
tour was used in this portion of the analysis. Many members of the Post-CSB CO group
are still serving in their commander tours, whereas many of the officers in the Pre-CSB
CO group completed more than one Commanding Officer tour, as shown in Table 2.
Cateqorv Number in Cateqorv
Number of Completed
Command Tours
Pre-CSB CO 1430 1514
Post-CSB CO 481 269
Table 2. Number of Completed Command Tours, by Group.
By using only completed command tours, "length bias sampling" is introduced into
this part of the analysis. By December 1996, when this data was drawn from the HQMC
data base, the Command Screening Process had been in effect for 44 months. All that is
known about the 212 command tours not used in this part of the analysis is that they were
not completed as of December 1996. This type of sampling is more likely to eliminate
command tours of longer duration, since longer tours are more likely to be continuing past
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the date the data was withdrawn and therefore not part of the 269 command tours used in
this portion of the analysis.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit test was the first test used on this
data. This tests the relationship between two distributions. Tests were conducted to
determine if either set of data fit the Normal distribution, and to see if the two data sets'
distributions fit each other. The null hypothesis is that the two distribution functions are
equal. [Ref. 12]
A two-Sample, one-sided t test was used to determine if the mean of the two
distributions was the same or if the mean of one distribution was "greater" than the other.
Even if the Goodness-of-Fit test above shows the data does not fit the Normal
distribution, the t test is robust with respect to departures from normality [Ref. 11].
Under the null hypothesis, the two means differ by a predetermined value. If this value is
set to zero, then the test is to check if the mean of one is greater than the mean of the
other. [Ref. 12]
The next assessment to conduct with this sample of the data, was to check if the
mean duration of command tours was actually at 1 8-24 months, as HQMC desires. The t
test mentioned above, is only used to compare the point estimates of the two means. In
this part of the analysis, confidence interval estimation is used to indicate the precision on
the point estimate ofthe mean command tour duration [Ref. 11].
The final use of the command tour duration data was to compare the Pre-CSB CO
group with the Post-CSB CO group in their number of relief s from command, which is
used as an indication of "failures." For the purpose of this analysis, a command duration
of less than eight months was considered a failure. The methods used to compare these
populations were proportion tests. Proportion tests are statistical tests to see if two
probabilities are the same. The Pearson's Chi-Squared statistic is used, which estimates
the common probability of occurrence as the total number of observed occurrences
divided by the total number of trials. [Ref. 13] If the Command Screening Board is
choosing more effective Commanding Officers, then the Post-CSB CO group should have
a lower proportion of failures than the Pre-CSB CO group.
2. Promoted to Colonel, Retired, or Passed Over
This section examines the four pairwise group comparisons in regard to the
groups' overall promotion percentage to Colonel, retirement as a Lieutenant Colonel prior
to being in the primary zone for consideration to the rank of Colonel, and retirement as a
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Lieutenant Colonel after being in the primary zone for consideration to the rank of Colonel
(Passed Over). Statistically, the proportion tests on this data were conducted in the same
manner as mentioned in the above subsection. Although independence does not exist
within a specific group, there is independence between two different groups and thus the
proportion test is still valid.
If the Command Screening Process is choosing more effective Commanding
Officers, then the analysis should show the results that follow. These postulations are also
based on the premise that the selection of a more effective CO is analogous to selection of
an officer who is more determined to spend a longer career in the Marine Corps.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Pre-CSB Not CO, Post-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO CO
groups should have a higher promotion proportion to Colonel, a lower retirement
proportion, and a lower passed over proportion. This should be true for both the
"Pre" and "PosP comparisons.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB CO: "Posf group should have a higher promotion
proportion to Colonel, a lower retirement proportion, and a lower passed over
proportion.
•Pre-CSB Not CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO: This comparison, by logic, should show
the opposite of the results obtained by the Commanding Officer comparison above.
Therefore, the "Posf group should have a lower promotion proportion to Colonel,
a higher retirement proportion, and a higher passed over proportion.
3. Promoted to Colonel Before, Within, or After Primary Promotion
Zone
This section looks at the four main comparison groups in regard to each group's
relative time of promotion to Colonel, given that they were promoted to Colonel. Only
those officers who were promoted are included in the numbers used for the proportion
tests of this section. Statistically, the proportion tests on this data were conducted in the
same manner as previously mentioned.
If the Command Screening Process is choosing more effective Commanding
Officers then the analysis should show the following listed results.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Pre-CSB Not CO, Post-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO CO
groups should have a higher "early" (before primary promotion zone) promotion
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proportion, a higher "on time" (within primary promotion zone) proportion, and a
lower "late" (after primary promotion zone) proportion. This should be true for
both the "Pre" and "Posf comparisons.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB CO "Post group should have a higher "early"
promotion proportion, a higher "on time" proportion, and a lower "late"
proportion.
•Pre-CSB Not CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO "Posf group should have a lower
"early" promotion proportion to Colonel, a lower "on time" proportion, and a
higher "late" proportion.
4. Commanding Officer as a Colonel
This section examines the four main comparison groups in regard to each group's
proportion of officers who held Colonel Commanding Officer billets, given that they were
promoted to Colonel. The length of time served as a Colonel was not determined.
Proportion tests were once again the method applied to the data.
If the Command Screening Process is choosing more effective Commanding
Officers then the analysis should show the following listed results.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Pre-CSB Not CO, Post-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO CO
groups should have a higher proportion of Colonel Commanding Officers. This
should be true for both the "Pre" and "Posf comparisons.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB CO "Posf group should have a higher proportion of
Colonel Commanding Officers.
•Pre-CSB Not CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO "Posf group should have a lower
proportion of Colonel Commanding Officers.
5. Officers Retiring at the End of Their Commanding Officer Billet
This section examines the propensity of an officer to retire, with his last billet being
that of a Commanding Officer. It does not take into account the number of years of
service an officer had at that time in his career. The postulations are further based on the
premise that the selection of a more effective Commanding Officer is also analogous to
selection of an officer who is more determined to spend a longer career in the Marine
Corps. Proportion tests are used for this comparison as in previous ones.
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There are two chances for an officer to be a Commanding Officer in this analysis,
either at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel. If the Command Screening Process is
choosing more effective Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officers, then this comparison
should show the following listed result.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB CO "PosT group should have a lower retirement
proportion.
For Commanding Officers at the rank of Colonel, the proportions should show the
following listed results.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Pre-CSB Not CO, Post-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO CO
groups should have a lower retirement proportion. This should be true for both
the "Pre" and "Post' comparisons.
•Pre-CSB CO vs. Post-CSB CO. "Post' group should have a lower retirement
proportion.
•Pre-CSB Not CO vs. Post-CSB Not CO "Post* group should have a higher
retirement proportion.
C. LIMITATIONS
The current analysis provides the methodology toward a fair judgment of the
Command Screening Process' success to date, but the results are often inconclusive. Such
an analysis will be much more decisive when, and if, it is repeated at some future time.
Presently, the careers of the officers affected by the Command Screening Process need
more time to "mature." This has already been observed when viewing the number of
Commanding Officers who have finished their command tour, displayed in Table 2 of
Section B. The fact that so many of the Post-CSB CO group are still in command
eliminated a lot of potential data when comparing the MOE concerning the duration of
command tours.
Also, a large percentage of the Lieutenant Colonels affected by the Command
Screening Process have not yet reached the primary promotion zone for selection to the
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rank of Colonel, as shown in Figure 4. Promotion, retirement, and passed over
proportions are, and will be in the future, a major yardstick to prove or disprove the
effectiveness of the Command Screening Process. This analysis is forced into using data
that has not yet reached its "steady state" to fairly compare these MOEs. Therefore, the
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Category
Figure 4. Percentage of Officers Not Yet in Primary Promotion Zone for Colonel, as of
December 1996.
In reference to Figure 4, showing the percentage of officers that do not yet have
sufficient time to be in the primary promotion zone for the Colonel promotion board, the
Pre-CSB CO group has an eleven percent posting, even though it seems that enough time
has passed that this value should be zero. This is explained by recalling that a member of
the Pre-CSB CO group may have begun his Commanding Officer tour as late as May 31,
1993, so it is reasonable that eleven percent have not yet reached enough time in rank as a
Lieutenant Colonel to be in the primary zone for the Colonel Promotion Board. The Pre-
CSB Not CO category shows a zero percent posting because all of the officers were either
retired, or promoted to Colonel prior to June 1, 1993. This is the way the group was
defined, as discussed in Chapter I, Section D.
In Figure 4, the Post-CSB Not CO category has a lower percentage than does the
Post-CSB CO group because the Post-CSB CO group consists of a younger population
(meaning less time in service). The FY93 Command Screening Board included all officers
who had not yet held Commanding Officer billets as Lieutenant Colonels, regardless of
seniority (meaning time in rank). If a Lieutenant Colonel was relatively senior and did not
24
already have a command, then the Command Screening Board recognized what the
appropriate Commanding General choosing Commanding Officers at the time recognized,
that the officer was probably not Commanding Officer material. Subsequently, this group
of senior Lieutenant Colonels rated being placed in the Post-CSB Not CO category.
Because the Post-CSB Not CO population is more senior, in general, they have enough
time in service to have been considered by a Colonel promotion board, at least more so
than the Post-CSB CO population.
If the FY93 Command Screening Process results had not been included in the data
base for this analysis, there would have been even fewer officers with enough time in rank
as Lieutenant Colonel to have reached the primary zone for selection to the rank of
Colonel. Future studies of the Command Screening Process may have the "luxury" of
eliminating the FY93 Command Screening Board data from the data set, if the remainder
ofthe officers have enough time in service to gather the necessary "career highlight" data.
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. DURATION OF A COMMANDING OFFICER TOUR
The first portion of the analysis examines the data to see if the average command
tour is longer, shorter, or the same as the average command tour prior to the
establishment of the Command Screening Process. A determination of the distribution of
the command tour length data is needed in order to apply the correct test procedures to
the comparison of the means.
The second part of this section establishes a confidence interval around the point
estimate of the mean command tour duration. The Marine Corps desires an 18-24 month
command tour duration, for consistency purposes. The creation of a confidence interval is
the tool that will be used to provide a determination if that goal is being achieved.
The final portion of this section compares the number of reliefs from command
between the Pre-CSB CO and the Post-CSB CO groups.
1. Distributions of Command Tour Durations
Histograms of the command tour length durations are given in Figure 5, for both





























Command Tour Length, in Months
Figure 5. Time, in Months, of Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer Tours.
Besides illustrating that the Pre-CSB CO population has a much higher population size,
the histograms show that the length of command tours for the Post-CSB CO group has
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generally adhered to the Command Screening Program's guidance. Likewise, the
command tour durations under the previous method of Commanding Officer selection
were by and large 17 to 26 months. The data used to make the histogram can also be used
to determine the distributions of the command tour durations for the Pre-CSB CO and
Post-CSB CO groups. The distributions are of interest in order to judge what statistical
process is necessary to compare the two means ofthe command tour lengths.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit tests were performed on the distributions
of the Pre-CSB CO group and the Post-CSB CO group. Each was tested with the Normal
distribution and then to each other. The "P value" for all three of the tests was zero.
Therefore, the null hypothesis, that the two compared distributions are the same, as well
as the normality of the distributions, was rejected in all cases. Several different
transformations to the data were applied and tested, also with negative results on fitting a
Normal distribution.
A comparison of the cumulative distribution functions of the Pre-CSB CO and the
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Figure 6. Cumulative Distribution Function of Duration of Command Tours.
The two distributions are approximately equal up to the 23 month point, after which they
deviate from each other. This means that the probability of having a command tour of less
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than or equal to any specific number of months less than (and including) 23 months is very
close to being the same for officers who commanded before and after the Command
Screening Process went into effect. The fact that the Post-CSB CO distribution line is
steeper than the Pre-CSB CO's after the 23 month point means that there is a greater
probability for longer command tours for the Pre-CSB CO group. For example, the Pre-
CSB CO group had a 21% chance of having a command tour longer than 25 months,
whereas his Post-CSB CO group peer has only a 5% chance.
2. The Mean Durations ofCommand Time
The point estimate of the mean command tour duration and its corresponding
standard deviation, in months, for each ofthe two populations is given in Table 3.
Cateqorv Mean Standard Deviation
Pre-CSB CO 21.24 7.03
Post-CSB CO 20.23 4.96
Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviation of Command
Tour Durations, in Months.
The point estimate of the mean command tour duration for the Pre-CSB CO group
is approximately one month greater than that of the Post-CSB CO group. There is also a
much greater variability of the command tour lengths for the Pre-CSB CO group, as
measured by the standard deviation.
Despite the failure of the data to fit a Normal distribution, a one-sided t test was
utilized, appropriately due to its robustness, to compare the mean durations of command
tours between the Pre-CSB CO and Post-CSB CO groups. The "P value" on this test was
0.0013, which indicates that the null hypothesis (the means are the same) can not be
accepted as being valid. This would suggest that the Marine Corps has statistically
decreased the mean duration of a command tour, and hence consistency of command, by
instituting the Command Screening Program. However, as mentioned in Section B of
Chapter III, length bias sampling had the effect of eliminating command tours of longer
duration from this portion of the analysis, since only completed command tours were
included in the proportions. Therefore, no decisive conclusion can be reached on whether
command tour durations have, in fact, decreased or not.
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3. Confidence Intervals
The next assessment of the duration of command tour data, was to determine if the
Marine Corps is achieving its goal in reaching the desired 18-24 month command duration
for the Post-CSB CO group. As a matter of interest, the Pre-CSB CO group command
tour duration confidence interval is also included. Table 3 provided the mean point
estimate for both populations. Table 4 shows the confidence intervals for some pre-
specified levels of confidence.











99% 20.77 21.72 19.45 21.01
95% 20.89 21.61 19.64 20.82
90% 20.95 21.55 19.73 20.73
Table 4. Confidence Intervals for Mean Command Tour Duration, in Months.
Therefore, one can be 99 percent confident that the true mean time of a
Commanding Officer tour by Lieutenant Colonels (who did have a command tour) in the
era of the Command Screening Process is between 19.45 and 21.01 months. Similarly, for
the Commanding Officers selected under the previous method of selection, one can be 99
percent confident that the true mean time of a Commanding Officer tour was between
20.77 and 21.72 months. The conclusion is that the Marine Corps is successfully
achieving its goal of reaching an 18-24 month length of command tour.
4. Relieved From Command
The final use of the duration of command tour data is for the comparison on the
number of relief s of command that have occurred since the institution of the Command
Screening Process. The assumptions and reservations associated with this comparison
were already discussed in Chapter III, Section A. The number of officers relieved from
command (a command tour of less than eight months) from both categories were very




Pre-CSB CO Post-CSB CO "P value"
Proportion Relieved
From Command 0.0049 0.0149 0.1451
Table 5. Comparison of Proportions of Officers Relieved from
Command.
The proportion in the Post-CSB CO group was higher, although not to a
statistically significant degree, than the Pre-CSB CO group. This was an unexpected
result from the postulation made in Chapter HI. This may change as the number of
completed command tours for the Post-CSB CO group increases, but the current data's
trend is not supportive of the Command Screening Process. The result, as reflected by
this MOE, suggests that the Command Screening Process is not choosing Commanding
Officers as effectively as the previous method, at least as indicated by the data to date.
The issue of loyalty may be an explanation for these results. In the Pre-CSB era, a
Commanding General had personal knowledge of the Lieutenant Colonel, along with his
strengths and weaknesses, prior to placing the officer in a Commanding Officer billet. The
Lieutenant Colonel knew that he was serving at the pleasure of the Commanding General
and a "loyalty bond," both up and down the chain of command, existed. To relieve the
Lieutenant Colonel would have meant the Commanding General's judgment was not well
founded in assigning the officer as a commander, and the loyalty bond would have been
broken. Based on the proportion for the Pre-CSB CO group, the bond was not often
broken.
Conversely, in the Post-CSB era, a Commanding General must accept the
Lieutenant Colonel commanders who are assigned to him from HQMC by way of the
Command Screening Process. There is no personal basis for the loyalty bond that existed
under the previous method of Commanding Officer selection. If the Lieutenant Colonel is
relieved, this is not a reflection of the Commanding General's lack of judgment to place
the officer in that billet, only seemingly bad judgment of the HQMC level Command
Screening Board to select that officer for command. Subsequently, more officers are
relieved from command and the results are as indicated.
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B. PROMOTED TO COLONEL, RETIRED, OR PASSED OVER
Since being promoted, voluntarily retiring, or being passed over (given a
mandatory retirement date) by the Colonel Promotion Board are the only three methods
by which an officer can cease being a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps, these
methods will sometimes be referred to as "terminal" events. The remainder of the officers
of this rank are still serving, as Lieutenant Colonels, in the Marine Corps and are not
included in this portion of the analysis when computing proportions for the four main
groups introduced in Chapter I, Section C.
When reviewing this section, it is important to keep in mind the small population
size of the Post-CSB CO group qualified to participate in this portion of the analysis.
Thus far, only 42 officers in the group have been promoted, voluntarily retired, or passed
over. For each of the proportions of the Post-CSB CO group represented in the
subsections that follow, one officer accounts for a little more than two percent of the
proportion. Nevertheless, results are determined based on the data as it stands. The
proportions are comprised ofthe numbers presented in Appendix B.
Proportion tests were once again the tool used for pairwise comparisons among
the groups, as presented in Section B of Chapter in. Instead of looking at the results of
the tests separately for each terminal condition, a more comprehensive comparison is
possible by looking at all three terminal conditions for each pairwise comparison. This
allows determination of the propensity of a group to prefer one terminal condition to
another, since for each group the sum of the three terminal condition's proportions will
add to one.
In addition, the purpose of this analysis is to determine if the Command Screening
Process results in selection of more successful, career oriented Commanding Officers than
the previous method of selection. Postulations as to what the results should be, if the
Command Screening Board method was in fact more effective, were made in Chapter HI,
Section B. The discussion following each set of test results will discuss whether the
postulations were achieved.
1. Comparison of the CO and Not CO Groups Prior to the Command
Screening Process
The test results of the Pre-CSB CO and Pre-CSB Not CO comparison category are
shown in Table 6.
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Pre-CSB Groups CO Not CO "P value"
Promoted 0.5000 0.2663 ~0
Retired 0.2417 0.5547 ~0
Passed Over 0.2583 0.1790 0.0001
Table 6. Comparison of Passed Over, Retired,
and Promoted Proportions of the Pre-CSB CO
and Pre-CSB Not CO Groups.
The results of the promotion comparison are as postulated, providing statistically
significant proof that there is a relative advantage for officers who command. By
percentage, almost twice as many commanders are promoted than Lieutenant Colonels
who do not command. The retirement comparison was also as postulated meaning that an
officer who commands is less likely to retire voluntarily. The two proportions in the
retired comparison were not expected to differ by such a high degree, but were anticipated
to be statistically significant in their differences. An explanation follows with the
discussion of the passed over results.
The passed over proportions provided an unexpected result, inasmuch as more
commanders are passed over than Lieutenant Colonels who did not command. The
proportions are different enough to be statistically significant. This result may partially be
explained by the high percentage of officers in the Pre-CSB Not CO group who voluntarily
retired as opposed to the Pre-CSB CO group that chose retiring as their least likely
terminal condition.
This left few remaining officers (44%) from the Pre-CSB Not CO group to be
promoted or passed over (i.e., eligible for the Colonel promotion board), which are the
only two terminal conditions remaining if an officer has not already voluntarily retired by
this point. Contrarily, over 75% of the Pre-CSB CO group were eligible for the Colonel
promotion board. Only 35% (Promoted / (Promoted + Passed Over)) of those from the
Pre-CSB Not CO group that were eligible for the Colonel promotion board were
promoted, whereas the Pre-CSB CO group enjoyed a promotion rate of 67%. Therefore,
the Passed Over proportion of the Pre-CSB Not CO group is less than the Passed Over
proportion of the Pre-CSB CO group, but the results still indicate that a higher proportion
of those who commanded are promoted.
The question that begs to be answered is "Does the Post-CSB Not CO group have
the same propensity to retire voluntarily vice waiting for the Colonel Selection Board, as
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did those prior to the Command Screening Process?" Also "Does the Post-CSB CO
group have the same propensity to wait for the Colonel Selection Board, usually with
favorable results, as did those prior to the Command Screening Process?" These
questions will be answered in the next analysis.
2. Comparison of the CO and Not CO Groups Under the Command
Screening Process
Table 7 consolidates the "Posf' comparison category of the passed over, retired
and promoted proportions.
Post-CSB Groups CO Not CO "P value"
Promoted 0.4524 0.2552 0.0133
Retired 0.3333 0.2828 0.6216
Passed Over 0.2143 0.4621 0.0042
Table 7. Comparison of Passed Over, Retired,
and Promoted Proportions of the Post-CSB CO
and Post-CSB Not CO Groups.
This comparison has two indicators that the Command Screening Board is
choosing more successful commanders than the previous method of selection. The
promotion proportions show that being a commander as a Lieutenant Colonel still remains
an advantage over officers who did not command in the Colonel promotion board,
although just barely in a statistically significant way. This is further reinforced by showing
that a statistically significant higher proportion of Not COs are passed over than officers
who did command.
The retired proportions show that the CO group is voluntarily retiring at a
somewhat higher rate than the Not CO group. This implies that the Command Screening
Process is not necessarily choosing Commanding Officers who are more likely to remain in
the Marine Corps, only officers who will be the best commanders. The notion that a good
commander means a more career oriented officer is not supported by this result.
The Post-CSB Not CO group displays a preference to wait for the Colonel
promotion board instead of retiring voluntarily, mostly with unfavorable results. Similarly,
the majority of the Post-CSB CO group awaits the Colonel promotion board, but unlike
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the Lieutenant Colonels who do not command, a higher proportion of the Commanding
Officers are promoted.
A look at the third and fourth pairwise comparisons will help identify how the CO
and Not CO populations each compare between the Pre and Post-CSB groups.
3. Comparison of the CO Groups, Prior and Post Command
Screening Process
The comparison of the Pre and Post Commanding Officer groups is shown in
Table 8.
CO Groups PRE POST "P value"
Promoted 0.5000 0.4524 0.6524
Retired 0.2417 0.3333 0.2391
Passed Over 0.2583 0.2143 0.6431
Table 8. Comparison of Passed Over, Retired,
and Promoted Proportions of the Pre-CSB CO
and Post-CSB CO Groups.
The passed over category comparison is the only result that meets the postulated
requirements of the Command Screening Process being more successful than the previous
method of selection for Commanding Officers. The proportions are favorable to the new
method, but not to a statistically significant degree. Nevertheless, it is a positive outcome
for the new selection process, that officers chosen by the board have a lower passed over
rate than the officers selected by the previous method.
The promotion and retirement category comparisons show the Command
Screening Process is failing to select more successful and career oriented Commanding
Officers (although not to a statistically significant degree) than the previous method of
selection. The relative proportion of officers promoted has decreased in the Post-CSB CO
group, while a greater proportion has also voluntarily retired. One possible explanation is
that there are few officers in the Post-CSB CO group who have enough time in service to
be considered by the Colonel promotion board. Once the Post-CSB CO group gains more
time in service, the trends of the promotion and retirement categories may fall in line with
the postulated results.
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The choice of Lieutenant Colonel terminating conditions between the Commanding
Officer populations has not significantly changed between the Pre and Post Command
Screening Process era. The Post-CSB CO group shows a 0.67 probability of awaiting the
Colonel promotion board whereas their Pre-CSB CO group peers had a higher (0.75)
probability.
Statistically, the above results imply that the Commanding Officers selected by the
Command Screening Process are about as effective, but not more effective, than the
Commanding Officers selected by the previous method.
4. Comparison of the Non-CO Groups, Prior and Post Command
Screening Process
The same trend comparison with the two groups of Lieutenant Colonels who were
not Commanding Officers is shown in Table 9.
Not CO Groups PRE POST "P value"
Promoted 0.2663 0.2552 0.7799
Retired 0.5547 0.2828 ~0
Passed Over 0.1790 0.4621 ~0
Table 9. Comparison of Passed Over, Retired,
and Promoted Proportions of the Pre-CSB
Not CO and Post-CSB Not CO Groups.
The original postulations for this comparison were based on the fact that along
with selection of Commanding Officers, the Command Screening Process is indirectly
selecting officers who will not be Commanding Officers. Therefore, if the process is now
more effective, officers who were not Commanding Officers should be less successful than
non-Commanding Officers prior to the Command Screening Process, as measured by
these criteria.
The promotion and passed over proportions are in the relative order as was
postulated, in fact the passed over relationship was such even to a statistically significant
degree. These results indicate that the non-commanders, since the Command Screening
Process was instituted, are not as effective officers as those who did not command under
the prior method of selection.
The results of the proportions of officers that retired from each group were not as
anticipated. The Pre-CSB Not CO group voluntarily retired at a much greater rate than
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the current rate of the Post-CSB Not CO group. This may be explained by the fact that
the Command Screening Board meets annually. If an officer is not selected in one year, he
still may be selected the following year when there are new members on the board.
Perhaps this keeps an officer's hopes alive and subsequently the officer remains in the
Marine Corps vice retiring.
The Not CO groups have had quite a substantial change in their preferences for
terminal conditions since the institution of the Command Screening Process. Over 71% of
the Post-CSB Not CO group, but only 45% of the Pre-CSB Not CO group, awaited the
Colonel promotion board.
5. Summary
Since this is a statistical analysis of the Command Screening Program, only results
which were statistically significant should be highlighted. The detailed discussion above
has discussed positive and negative trends in the proportions, specifying if the trend is
statistically significant or not.
Statistically, if an officer is a Commanding Officer during the "Post" Command
Screening Process, his chance of being promoted, retired, or passed over is about the
same as if he commanded prior to the Command Screening Process. If an officer is not a
Commanding Officer during the "Post" Command Screening Process, he has about the
same probability of being promoted, a higher probability of being passed over, and a lower
probability of voluntarily retiring than did his peer in the "Pre" Command Screening
Process era.
C. PROMOTED TO COLONEL BEFORE, WITHIN, OR AFTER THE
PRIMARY ZONE
The previous section examined the three terminal events in the career of a
Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps. The officer either was promoted, retired
voluntarily or was passed over. The MOE examined in this section will look at just a
piece of the previous data, the promotions, and conduct more detailed analysis.
Given that an officer is promoted, there are three possible time frames when the
event occurs, "early," "on time," or "late." This classification is dependent on whether he
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was promoted prior to . within, or after the year for which he was in the primary zone for
the Colonel promotion board.
The "eligible" list for Colonel promotion boards was not available, therefore the
"begin date" of an officer's first Lieutenant Colonel fitness report determined the year for
which he was in the primary zone for consideration of promotion to the rank of Colonel.
The "fitness report determined eligible date," the date that each year's Colonel Promotion
List started promoting and finished promoting (cleared), and an officer's first Colonel
fitness report's "begin date" were compared to determine whether an officer was promoted
early, on time, or late. The Colonel's Promotion List information was obtained from
HQMC, Officer Promotion Branch (Code MMPR1). If an officer was frocked and given a
fitness report at the time, then he will be a member of the early category, as discussed in
Chapter II, Section B.
Because of the lack of actual information on Colonel Promotion Boards
concerning early, on time, and late promotions, the numbers computed for each
classification, and therefore the proportions, are estimates only. These proportions
however, are still valid for comparison purposes because they are all figured consistently,
so each group has the same bias (if any) for each promotion year. The degree to which
the proportions for two groups differ, and the corresponding "P value" of the proportion
test, identify if the proportions are statistically the same or different. The results of the
proportion tests will be compared to the postulations given in Section B of Chapter III, so
that it can be determined if by these measures, the Command Screening Board is choosing
more effective Commanding Officers than the previous method of selection.
There are 19 officers within the Post-CSB CO group qualified to participate in this
portion of the analysis. For each of the proportions of the Post-CSB CO group
represented in the subsections that follow, one officer accounts for a little more than five
percent of the proportion. Results are determined based on the data as it stands. The
proportions are comprised of the numbers presented in Appendix B.
1. Comparison of the CO and Not CO Groups Prior to the Command
Screening Process
The proportions of officers from the groups, and results of the proportion tests
between the two groups, concerning promotions to the rank of Colonel are in Table 10.
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Pre-CSB Groups CO Not CO "P value"
early 0.1892 0.1333 0.1049
on time 0.6328 0.6278 0.9726
late 0.1781 0.2389 0.0852
Table 10. Comparison of Early, On Time, and
Late Promotion Proportions of the Pre-CSB CO
and Pre-CSB Not CO Groups.
In none of the comparisons do the proportions differ by a statistically significant
degree, however all of the relationships between the proportions are as postulated. The
Commanding Officer group has a higher proportion of early and on time promotions and a
lower proportion of late promotions than officers who did not command. The late
promotion comparison has the smallest "P value" seen in these pair-wise comparisons (as
well as in all the future pairwise comparisons of this section). A "P value" of 0.0852
means that the results "almost" show a statistically significant higher late promotion rate
among the Not CO group than among CO group, which is the expected relationship.
The results of the above tests support the premise of a relative advantage that
commanders have over officers who do not command, (although not statistically
significantly so) under the previous method for selection of Commanding Officers.
2. Comparison of the CO and Not CO Groups Under the Command
Screening Process
The proportions of officers from the groups, and results of the proportion tests
between the two groups, concerning promotions to the rank of Colonel are in Table 11.
Post-CSB Groups CO Not CO "P value"
early 0.2632 0.1757 0.5923
on time 0.6842 0.6351 0.8965
late 0.0526 0.1892 0.2740
Table 11. Comparison of Early, On Time, and
Late Promotion Proportions of the Post-CSB CO
and Post-CSB Not CO Groups.
The relationship between the proportions of the CO group and the Not CO group
is as postulated for the early, on time, and late promotions, similarly to the "Pre"
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Command Screening Board era. However, once again, the "P values" show that the null
hypothesis can not be rejected in any of these comparisons, meaning that none of the
differences are statistically significant. It can still be stated that the same advantage that
commanders had over officers who do not command under the previous method of
selection of Commanding Officers remains to be true for commanders selected by the
Command Screening Board.
3. Comparison of the CO Groups, Prior and Post Command
Screening Process
The proportions of officers from the groups, and results of the proportion tests
between the two groups, concerning promotions to the rank of Colonel are in Table 12.
CO Groups PRE POST "P value"
early 0.1892 0.2632 0.6089
on time 0.6328 0.6842 0.8281
late 0.1781 0.0526 0.2658
Table 12. Comparison of Early, On Time, and
Late Promotion Proportions of the Pre-CSB CO
and Post-CSB CO Groups.
The proportion comparisons are all supportive of the Command Screening
Process, although none of them to a statistically significant degree. More of the
commanders selected by the Command Screening Process are promoted early and on time,
with fewer being promoted late. This indicates that a higher quality officer is filling
commanding officer billets than used to be the case.
4. Comparison of the Non-CO Groups, Prior and Post Command
Screening Process
The proportions of officers from the groups, and results of the proportion tests
between the two groups, concerning promotions to the rank of Colonel are in Table 13.
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Not CO Groups PRE POST "P value"
early 0.1333 0.1757 0.5007
on time 0.6278 0.6351 0.9121
late 0.2389 0.1892 0.4857
Table 13. Comparison of Early, On Time, and
Late Promotion Proportions of the Pre-CSB CO
and Post-CSB CO Groups.
As was the case in Section B of this chapter, the postulations for this comparison
were based on the fact that along with selection of Commanding Officers, the Command
Screening Process is indirectly selecting officers who will not be Commanding Officers.
Therefore, officers who were not Commanding Officers under the new process should be
less effective than the non-Commanding Officers prior to the Command Screening
Process, as measured by these criteria.
However, in this case, none of the relationships between the proportions of the Pre
and Post Not CO groups were as postulated. Since not selected to command, and in view
of the above paragraph, the Post-CSB Not CO group should be more frequently promoted
late if at all. Instead, the results indicate that the officers not selected by the Command
Screening Process are still of a higher quality (more effective) than officers not selected
for command under the previous era.
5. Summary
It is striking that all of the "P values" are quite high for the on time promotions in
each comparison, indicating all groups have nearly identical on time proportions. This
means that generally, there is not any difference between CO and Not CO groups
proportions, nor between Pre and Post groups.
The detailed discussion above has discussed positive and negative trends in the
proportions, specifying if the trend is statistically significant or not. Statistically, if an
officer is a Commanding Officer (or not a Commanding Officer) during the "Post"
Command Screening Process, his chance of being promoted early, on time, or late is
about the same as an officer who commanded (or did not command) prior to the
Command Screening Process. Furthermore, there is not a statistically significant
difference in the proportion of officers promoted early, on time, or late between those who
commanded and those who did not command. This is true both before and after the
Command Screening Process was instituted. Because of this, one would conclude that the
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Command Screening Process is choosing Commanding Officers "just as effectively, but
not more effectively" as the officers chosen by the previous method when judged by these
MOEs.
Although not to a statistically significant degree, the trend in the relationship of the
proportions for early, on time, and late promotions is in an encouraging direction for the
Command Screening Process.
D. COMMANDING OFFICER AS A COLONEL
This section will examine the four main pairwise comparisons as introduced in
Section B of Chapter EI, in regard to the number of officers who held Colonel
Commanding Officer billets. The size of the populations used to determine the
proportions is the same as in section C above. The proportions are comprised of the
numbers presented in Appendix B.
The length of command as a Colonel was not determined, nor is this analysis based on a







Pre-CSB CO and Pre-CSB Not CO 0.5580 0.3167 ~0
Post-CSB CO and Post-CSB Not CO 0.2105 0.2703 0.8127
Pre-CSB CO and Post-CSB CO 0.5580 0.2105 0.0057
Pre-CSB Not CO and Post-CSB Not CO 0.3167 0.2703 0.5614
Table 14. Comparison of Proportions of Officers who were Commanding Officers as
Colonels.
The result of the first comparison category indicates that officers who commanded
as Lieutenant Colonels, under the prior method of selection of Commanding Officers, had
a much higher probability of commanding as Colonels as well. The perceived advantage
of Lieutenant Colonel commanders over non-commanders is once again proven to be true
to a statistically significant degree for the Pre-CSB era. The fourth comparison category,
concerning the Not CO groups, achieves the postulated results as well, however not
enough to be statistically significant. The relationship of the proportions indicate that the
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Post-CSB Not CO population is not as effective as an officer who did not command prior
to the establishment ofthe Command Screening Process.
The results of the other two comparisons did not achieve the postulated results.
The Post-CSB CO group has a lower proportion of Colonel Commanding Officers than
the Not CO group. The results indicate the CO population does not have an advantage
over officers who do not command in the Post-CSB era. The other comparison that does
not achieve the postulated result is the one concerning the two CO populations. The
"Pre" group had a much greater proportion of Colonel Commanding Officers than does
the "Posf group, sufficient to be statistically significant. Neither of these two results is
supportive of the Command Screening Process. The best explanation for the outcome of
these proportion tests is perhaps the small population size of the Post-CSB CO group.
Once the group gains more time in service, and with that more promotions to Colonel as
well as more seniority at the Colonel rank, the proportions may change.
The conclusion, based on the number of Colonel Commanding Officers, is that the
Command Screening Process is not selecting more effective Commanding Officers than
the previous method by this measure. Also, there is not a statistically significant difference
in the proportion of officers commanding as Colonels between those who commanded and
those who did not command as Lieutenant Colonels for the groups after the Command
Screening Process was instituted. This is contrary to the CO, Not CO relationship that
existed before the Command Screening Process was instituted.
E. OFFICERS RETIRING AT THE END OF THEIR COMMANDING
OFFICER BILLET
The MOE in this section conducts proportion tests to examine the propensity of an
officer to retire immediately upon the completion of his Commanding Officer tour. There
are two opportunities for this occurrence, as either a Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel
Commanding Officer. When using retirement as an MOE to compare the Command
Screening Process to the prior method of selection, there is a premise that the selection of
a more effective Commanding Officer implies the selection of a more career oriented
officer who is determined to spend a longer time in the Marine Corps. The results of the
comparison for Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officers is shown in Table 15.
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CO Groups PRE POST "P value"
proportions and test result 0.0734 0.0223 0.0029
Table 15. Comparison of Proportions of Officers who Retired
Immediately at the End of their Lieutenant Colonel Commanding
Officer Billet
The population sizes eligible for this MOE are the original numbers in the
category, 1430 officers for the Pre-CSB CO group and 481 officers for the Post-CSB CO
group. The proportions are comprised of the numbers presented in Appendix B.
Although the two proportions may not seem to differ by very much, the "P value"
indicates that one must reject the null hypothesis, and conclude the proportions are
different.
The proportions show the result that was postulated, in favor of the Command
Screening Process to a statistically significant degree. A possible explanation may be that
the Commanding Officers prior to the Command Screening Board were generally of
retirement eligibility and officers after the Command Screening Board were not. If this
were the case then the results could be skewed in favor of the Command Screening
Process. The data base does not provide enough information to clarify the reason either
way.
The other group to examine with this MOE are officers who retired immediately
following Commanding Officer billets as Colonels. Unfortunately, the two "Posf
populations have not had any occurrences, therefore they can not be included in the
comparison. The "Pre" comparison is offered as historical data for future studies that
wish to compare their result with a Post-CSB result that can be derived once more data
becomes available about the Post groups. Table 16 provides the comparison of the Pre-
CSB groups.
Pre-CSB Groups CO Not CO "P value"
proportions and test result 0.0399 0.1128 0.0212
Table 16. Comparison of Proportions of Officers who Retired
Immediately at the End of their Colonel Commanding Officer Billet
The "P value" in this case is near the borderline for acceptance or rejection of the
null hypothesis. One may cautiously reject the null hypothesis, saying the proportions are
different. Nevertheless, the relationship of the proportions support the postulation.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the Command Screening
Program, in effect since 1992, is a "better" system of selecting battalion and squadron
Commanding Officers than the prior selection method. Previously, Commanding Generals
in that unit's chain of command chose the Lieutenant Colonel commanders from the
officers within their division or wing. Four mutually exclusive groups of officers,
reflecting whether or not an officer was affected by the Command Screening Process and
whether or not he was a Commanding Officer at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, were
analyzed and compared in terms of applicable MOEs.
Each of the conclusions is based on certain assumptions that "qualify" the
conclusions in many of the cases. An assessment of the effectiveness of the Command
Screening Process should not be reached without reading the discussion of the
assumptions in Section A of Chapter HI.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. MOEs Supportive of the Command Screening Process
The Command Screening Process was found to be more effective in selection of
Commanding Officers than the prior method of selection in the below listed areas. If the
advantage to the Command Screening Process was such to a statistically significant
degree, it is noted by an asterisk (*).
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has been passed over for the rank of
Colonel. *
•A higher proportion ofCommanding Officers has been promoted early and on time
to Colonel.
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has been promoted late to Colonel.
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has retired immediately at the end of
their Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer billet. *
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In addition to the statistical advantages, the Command Screening Process was
found to have other attributes, listed below, that are supportive ofthe program.
•All Lieutenant Colonels in the Marine Corps are considered for Commanding
Officer Billets.
•Command assignments are arranged by the monitors who ensure that there is no
time gap between Commanding Officers for Marine Corps units.
2. MOEs That are Not Supportive of the Command Screening Process
The Command Screening Process was less effective in selection of Commanding
Officers than the prior method of selection by the below listed criteria. If the disadvantage
to the Command Screening Process was to a statistically significant degree, it is noted by
an asterisk (*).
•A lower proportion of Commanding Officers has been promoted.
•A higher proportion ofCommanding Officers has voluntarily retired. *
•A lower proportion of Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officers has become
Colonel Commanding Officers. *
3. Summary
The first tenet of the Command Screening Program is to ensure Marines are led by
the most qualified Lieutenant Colonels in the Marine Corps. The conclusion on this tenet
is that the most qualified Lieutenant Colonels are leading the Marines, but generally they
were before the Command Screening Process also.
The second tenet is to ensure that all Lieutenant Colonels are afforded an equal
opportunity to compete for command. By the conduct of an annual board at HQMC, this
tenet is being achieved. This certainly gives all officers equal footing in the selection
process.
The third tenet is to formalize command assignments. There is not a good MOE
to measure this tenet. Essentially, one could say it is accomplished by the conduct of the
selection board and subsequent slating of selected officers by the monitors.
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The fourth tenet is to eliminate sponsorship and cronyism. Once again, having an
annual board that considers all eligible officers is the best measure to ensure this tenet is
achieved. Although there may be personal knowledge of some of the Lieutenant Colonels
being considered by some board members, a majority vote of the 14 members of the board
is required for selection. A couple of board members' personal bias will not be enough to
make (or not make) the Lieutenant Colonel a Commanding Officer.
The conclusion of the analysis is that the Command Screening Process is achieving
its stated creed . The statistical analysis provides some interesting trends and statistics.
There are two MOEs that statistically indicate the process is better, two that indicate it is
worse, and the remainder that indicate no statistical difference between Commanding
Officers selected by the Command Screening Process and commanders selected by
Commanding Generals, the previous method. More career highlights of the majority of
officers affected by the Command Screening Process must come to pass before any
statistically definitive decisions on the value of the process can be reached. This thesis has
established the methodology by which future researchers may prove, one way or the other,
whether the Command Screening Process is actually a better method of selection. Having
a Command Screening Program does make the selection of Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officers a fair, formal process, and that makes it worth keeping.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
An analysis, using the same methodology, needs to be conducted every two years
or so to judge the trends as the populations gain more time in service and more time in
rank. As discussed throughout this analysis, at this time the lack of follow on career data
of officers affected by the Command Screening Process kept the amount of data available
for analysis very limited. If an officer had not yet reached a career highlight, such as being
in the primary zone for the Colonel promotion board, than he could not be included in the
analysis for that MOE.
Future studies of the Command Screening Process may include the "screened, not
slated" officers as a separate category. The challenge that arises when trying to
accomplish this is that an officer's status changes year by year if he is eligible for more
than one Command Screening Board. The majority of officers eligible for the board in
year "x" are also eligible in year "x + 1." For example, between 20 to 36 percent of the
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officers in the "screened, not slated" category went on to be "screened and slated" the
following year, depending on the year in question. This could lead to a Markovian







Transition rates among the states could be estimated by using the data available
from the four years of Command Screening Board results (FY93 - FY96). The FY98
results will soon be released also. The goal of such an analysis would be to answer such
questions as "What proportion of officers who are in one of the above states will be
screened and slated at some future date?" This is of great interest to career counselors at
the branch of HQMC whom Marine Corps officers consult to determine the types of
assignments needed for career enhancement and their likelihood of success with future
promotion boards.
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APPENDIX A. NUMBER OF OFFICERS FOR EACH CATEGORY
Category Number in Category
Pre-CSB CO 1430
Post-CSB CO 481
Pre-CSB Not CO 687




APPENDIX B. NUMBERS FOR DETERMINING PROPORTIONS
Pre-CSB Groups Post-CSB Groups
CO Not CO CO Not CO
Promotion to Colonel 629/1258 180/676 19/42 74/290
Retired 304/1258 375/676 14/42 82/290
Passed Over 325/1258 121/676 9/42 134/290
Early 119/629 24/180 5/19 13/74
On Time 398/629 113/180 13/19 47/74







CO Billet 105/1430 na 6/269 na
Retire From Col
CO Billet 14/351 7/57 na na
Relieved from
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